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Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko 
 
The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  





This paper focuses on the role of the banking sector in monetary policy transmission in an emerging 
economy with a rapidly developing financial system. Specifically, we exam whether the central 
bank's monetary policy stance affects banks' lending behaviour. Based on a comprehensive quarter-
ly dataset on all Russian banks from 1Q1999 to 1Q2007, we find evidence for the existence of a 
bank lending channel in Russia. Contrary to several studies on developed economies, the level of a 
bank's capitalization matters for the transmission process. Better capitalized banks are less likely to 
adjust their lending practices following a change in the monetary policy stance.  
 
JEL: C23, E44, E52, G21 
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Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko 
 
The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  






Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pankkisektorin roolia rahapolitiikan välittymisessä Venäjän kal-
taisessa kehittyvässä taloudessa. Työ perustuu laajaan neljännesvuosittaiseen paneeliaineistoon, jo-
ka kattaa kaikki Venäjän liikepankit vuosina 1999–2007. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että keskuspan-
kin politiikkatoimet vaikuttavat liikepankkien lainantarjontaan. Toisin sanoen löydämme tukea sille 
että pankeilla on  lainanantokanava Venäjällä. Toisin kuin mm. USA:ssa ja euroalueella pankkien 
vakavaraisuus  vaikuttaa  rahapolitiikan  välittymiseen  pankkien  kautta.  Hyvin  pääomitetut  pankit 
reagoivat merkittävästi vähemmän rahapolitiikan muutoksiin.  
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1  Introduction  
 
In recent decades there has been a surge of economic literature on monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms. The most traditional view is characterised by the interest rate channel. Expansionary 
(contractionary) monetary policy lowers (raises) money market interest rates, thereby reducing (in-
creasing) borrowing  costs and boosting (reducing) loan demand, investments  and consumption. 
Moreover, theory offers several  other transmission  channels,  including  the exchange  rate, asset 
price and credit channels. The credit channel, formalised by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), can be 
further decomposed into the asset price and bank lending channels. The bank lending channel, 
which  includes an important role for banks in the transmission process, is of special interest in this 
study.  
In the context  of a bank lending  channel,  a tightening (loosening) of  monetary policy 
causes a contraction (expansion) in banks’ loan supply. The underlying assumption is that when 
faced with a decrease in liquidity, banks reduce the loan supply. There is ample evidence that  ag-
gregate bank lending decreases after a tightening of monetary policy. This, however, could as well 
be caused by a contraction in loan demand (via the interest rate channel) as by a contraction in loan 
supply (bank lending channel). To sort out the changes in loan supply from changes in loan de-
mand, the literature has focused on cross-sectional differences between banks. It is usually assumed 
that, after a monetary tightening, all banks experience a decrease in liquid core deposits and a reced-
ing demand for bank loans. Some banks may find it difficult to compensate for the loss of loanable 
funds and hence contract the loan supply. This contraction amplifies the transmission of monetary 
policy into the real economy.  
The increased availability of large micro-level data sets has facilitated the growth in em-
pirical literature focusing on these issues. Largely due to data availability, the studies have mainly 
focused on the US and EU economies. Most studies on euro area economies do find that a bank 
lending channel exists, whereas the studies on the US provide a more mixed set of results.
 1 The 
evidence from emerging countries where the banking sectors are still in the making is so far fairly 
                                                 
1 See Ehrmann et al (2003) and Gambacorta (2005) and the references therein for a summary of studies on the euro 
area. Kishan and Opiela (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000) for the US case.  Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
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patchy and fragmented.
2 There are, however, good reasons to assume that bank lending may indeed 
be an influential channel of monetary policy transmission especially in these economies. 
As evidenced by the various studies on the euro area countries (Ehrmann et al, 2003), the 
structure of the banking sector may greatly influence the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. 
For the contraction in bank loan supply to be transmitted into the real economy, it is necessary that 
some firms be unable to substitute other forms of external finance for bank credit. Therefore, banks’ 
lending behaviour is likely to transmit monetary policy changes into the real economy more readily 
in economies with bank-based financial systems. Most European (developed as well as emerging) 
economies rely much more heavily on bank finance than does the US. Comparing the ratio of total 
banking sector assets to GDP in a number of European countries and the US reveals that banks are 
much more important in Europe. Consequently, bank loans play a much more important in corpo-
rate finance in Europe, whereas in the US the stock and bond markets are considerably more impor-
tant. 
In an emerging economy like Russia, bank loans are typically short-term and hence may 
speed up the transmission process. Moreover, informational frictions between individual banks are 
likely to be more pronounced in a banking system characterised by a large number of small banks, 
relatively frequent bank failures, short credit histories, and slowly improving regulation. We there-
fore feel that examining the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in Russia should be espe-
cially fruitful.   
Following the tradition of Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Ehrmann et al (2003), we rely on 
cross-sectional differences in micro-level data on the Russian banking sector to examine whether 
the bank loan supply is affected by changes in domestic monetary policy.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the monetary poli-
cy framework in Russia and discusses the possible transmission channels. Further, some systemic 
features of the Russian banking sector are examined in the light of the previous literature. Section 
three describes the data and estimation methodology used in the analysis. Section four presents our 
empirical evidence on the existence of a bank lending channel in Russia, and the last section con-




                                                 
2 The great number of working papers on emerging economies include Matousek and Sarantis (2009) on Central and 
Eastern Europe, Golodniuk (2006) on Ukraine, Arena et al (2007) on Latin America and Asia, Benkovskis (2008) on 
Latvia, Juks (2004) on Estonia.   
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2  The structure of the banking system and monetary policy 
transmission in Russia 
 
2.1  Monetary policy 
 
The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has for several years aimed at a dual target of stable nominal 
exchange rate and low inflation. Since 1998, the de facto target has been the exchange rate, most 
recently vis-à-vis a currency basket composed of the US dollar and the euro. In its annual Guide-
lines for the Single State Monetary Policy, the CBR has specified the inflation target and forecast 
range for growth of the rouble money stock (M2). 
The CBR’s set of monetary policy tools has been fairly restricted, and M2 growth has 
served as an information tool. The role of CBR interest rates is limited at best. With few steriliza-
tion tools, there has been an apparent tradeoff between controlling rising inflation and limiting the 
pace of nominal rouble appreciation.  
 
Table 1 Inflation targets and M2 projections of the Central Bank of Russia  
  Year-end inflation target  Inflation outcome 
Year-end M2 growth pro-
jection  
M2 growth outcome 
2000  18%  20.2%  21-25%  61.5% 
2001  12-14%  18.6%  27-34%  39.7% 
2002  12-14%  15.1%  22-28%  32.4% 
2003  10-12%  12.0%  20-26%  50.5% 
2004  8-10%  11.7%  19-25%  35.8% 
2005 
8.5% (later revised to 
11%) 
10.9% 
19-28% (target for base 
money) 
30.0% (outcome for 
base money) 
2006  8.5%  9.0%  19-28%  48.8% 
2007  6.5-8%  11.9%  19-29%  47.5% 
Source: Target rates as in Korhonen and Mehrotra (2009), realised outcome figures from the Central Bank of Russia. 
 
Russia's capital flows have been liberalised. In the last couple of years, perfect capital movements 
have led to a sizable current account surplus requiring large unsterilized CBR interventions in the 
foreign-exchange market, translating into excess liquidity in the banking system. A portion of the 
oil dollars has been channelled into a Stabilization Fund.
 3 
                                                 
3 In 2007, net capital inflows not allocated to the Stabilization Fund, about half of which went into the banking sector, 
caused rapid money expansion which, along with rising food and energy prices, pushed inflation above 12% in the first 
quarter of 2008. Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
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Both  commercial  banks  and  large  corporations  have  borrowed  heavily  from  abroad 
through IPOs, Eurobonds and syndicated loans. Bank lending has increased rapidly in the last few 
years. Currently about 2/3 of loans are in roubles, and the share of the dollar is still shrinking. But 
the effect of dollarization on monetary policy transmission has not been studied a great deal. Keller 
and Richardson (2003) conclude that in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), high degrees of dollarization have contributed to the exchange rate interventions as a key in-
strument of monetary policy. 
To date, very little is generally known about the transmission channels of monetary policy 
in Russia. Esanov et al (2005) estimate alternative monetary policy rules and find that, in 1993-
2004, the CBR used monetary aggregates as the main policy instrument. Vdovichenko and Voron-
ina (2006) also examine monetary policy rules and suggest that the CBR’s major concern in 1999-
2003 was to stabilize the exchange rate and that monetary targeting was its main monetary tool. 
Vinhas da Souza (2006) analyses the interest rate and bank lending channels of monetary 
policy transmission in Russia. Relying on an annual panel of 323 Russian banks for 1995-2003, he 
finds very weak signs of either one, but concludes that the effects are linked to the level of bank as-
sets and bank capitalization.   
Vymyatnina  (2006a)  analyses  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanisms  in  Russia  in 
1995-2004 via a structural vector error correction model (SVECM) as a special case of the struc-
tural VAR approach. She concludes that in the absence of a stable money multiplier and given the 
CBR’s less-than-perfect control of base money, use of monetary aggregates as monetary policy in-
struments might not be the best choice, so that the CBR should introduce interest rate tools simulta-
neously with the further development of the financial system. Vymyatnina (2006b) finds indirect 
evidence of the interest rate channel of monetary policy operating in Russia in 1995-2004, by look-
ing at the money supply. 
Research on money demand has reached somewhat contradictory results. Korhonen and 
Mehrotra (2009) conclude from previous studies that widespread dollarization and the 1998 crisis 
have introduced a large degree of uncertainty into the empirical results. They rely on data from the 
post-crisis period and find a stable money demand relationship when augmented by a deterministic 
downward trend in velocity. Broad money shocks lead to higher inflation, and exchange rate fluc-
tuations have had a significant influence on Russian money demand. They suggest that the exis-
tence of a stable money demand at least partially vindicates the CBR’s policy of linking money 
growth forecasts and inflation targets, and the close attention paid to the rouble rate. 
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In August 2008, CBR’s new monetary policy framework for 2009-2011 featured inflation 
fighting as the major objective of the central bank. The plan is that by 2011 monetary policy im-
plementation will be largely based on inflation targeting and, for the first time, the monetary policy 
framework did not include specific limits on rouble appreciation. The CBR is supposed to gradually 
reduce its currency market interventions. 
 
2.2  Banking sector 
 
Economic growth at record high levels for several consecutive years, high export incomes, budget 
surpluses, structural reforms in the early 2000s, and further development of the international capital 
markets have contributed to the rapid growth of the Russian banking sector. For many years now, 
credit has grown on average by 50% per year and deposits by 40%. 
Despite increasing demand for banking services due to robust economic growth, a rela-
tively small number of Russian banks are “real” banks, whose main income source is intermediation 
of deposits into loans. The overall extent of financial intermediation is still low, as most invest-
ments are financed from firm’s internal sources. Bank financing accounts for just 10% of corporate 
sector fixed investments. As of end-2007, bank assets amounted to 61% of GDP, household depos-
its 16% and credit to the private sector 37%. Although corporate borrowing has increased rapidly, 
Russian companies have been forced to borrow abroad, as the domestic banking sector has not been 
able to meet the demand for long-term financing driven by strong economic growth. 
 
Table 2  Selected indicators, % of GDP 
  
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Total banking sector assets  36  38  42  42  45  52 
Broad money M2  18  20  24  26  28  33 
Bank credit to the private sector  15  17  20  23  25  30 
o/w enterprises  14  16  18  20  20  23 
o/w households  1  1  2  3  5  7 
Bank deposits by the public  18  20  24  24  27  32 
o/w households  8  10  12  17  13  14 
Note: Data as of the start of each period. Source: Central Bank of Russia, Obzor Bankovskovo Sektora.  
  
Due to legacies from the privatization of (large) banks following the Soviet era, the financial crisis 
of 1998, restrictions on foreign banks’ participation, and a lack of domestic competition; Russian 
banking is now characterized by a combination of a large number of banks (1125 at mid-2008) and Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
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a heavy concentration of assets in a few state-controlled ones. Sberbank, VTB (Vneshtorgbank) and 
Gazprombank accounted for almost 40% of total assets and the next largest 200 banks for about 
50% of total assets in the sector. Sberbank held 50% of deposits alone, and was the 33
rd biggest 
bank in the world according to The Banker. Currently, however, most private banks are de novo 
banks, and most public banks were created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, by various gov-
ernment bodies. 
Foreign bank entrance to  the market  has  been limited, though in  recent  years Russian 
banks have diversified into retail banking while Small and Medium Enterprises have improved their 
governance in order to attract international funding. As a result, international institutions have ac-
quired  in  particular  banks  with  developed  retail  networks,  as  a  means  of  entering  the  market. 
Branches of foreign banks are so far not allowed. About a quarter of the total bank assets are in for-
eign hands. 
The capital adequacy ratios of Russian banks have been affected by the rapid credit expan-
sion, though they are still at reasonable levels. The smaller banks have continued to experience dif-
ficulties in attracting equity investments, and even the larger ones have revised their funding plans 
due to global liquidity conditions. The generally low level of confidence between the banks adds to 
the vulnerability of the sector’s liquidity, and the interbank market does not distribute liquidity effi-
ciently. Small banks are often shut out from access to finance.  
Turning to the questions specific to our analysis of the bank lending channel in Russia, and 
arising from the structure of the banking sector, large banks may buffer their credit supply from 
monetary policy shocks. In their study of the relationship between banking competition and the 
transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel, Adams and Amel (2005) find 
that the impact of monetary policy on loan originations is weaker in more concentrated markets.  
Furthermore, according to Ehrmann et al (2003), one can argue that the existence of ”house 
banks” in several European countries, most notably Germany, may at least mute the reaction of 
bank loan supply to monetary policy. Thus the Russian “pocket banks”, which serve non-banks 
only  within  a  particular  business  grouping,  would  presumably  also  reduce  the  effectiveness  of 
monetary policy. 
In general, one of the main problems of the Russian banking sector seems to be the lack of 
competition and the related lack of restructuring. Karas et al (2008) show that both foreign banks 
and domestic public banks are more efficient than domestic private banks, indicating that the Rus-
sian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access for 
foreign banks than from bank privatization.   
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Finally, due to the structural problems of the sector and mistrust in the interbank market 
there has thus far been a reluctance to let even small banks go bankrupt, because in the present ru-




3  The model and identification of the lending channel 
 
 
The main argument for the lending channel of monetary policy transmission, as formalised by Ber-
nanke and Blinder (1988), is that changes in monetary policy affect the amount of deposits (money) 
available to banks. The lending channel arises because some banks find it difficult to offset changes 
in the level of deposits except by adjusting their loan supply.   
Typically, we would assume that in equilibrium money demand D equals money supply M 
and that money demand depends on monetary policy:  
 
             (1) 
 
Loan demand depends on real DGP (y), price level (p) and the loan interest rate (r): 
 
             (2) 
 
The supply of loans depends directly on the amount of loanable funds (deposits or money) D avail-
able, the loan interest rate r and the monetary policy stance (mp): 
 
           (3) 
 
Monetary policy, typically approximated by a central bank’s policy interest rate, enters the loan 
supply function both directly and indirectly. First, the direct link is the opportunity cost for a bank 
that uses interbank markets to finance loans. Secondly, the amount of deposits (or money) available 
depends negatively on the policy interest rate. Following Ehrmann et al (2001), we further assume 
that banks are not equally dependent on deposit finance. The impact of deposits on loan supply de-
pends on bank characteristics Xi (size, capitalization liquidity): Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
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             (4) 
 
Assuming that the loan market clears and using the equations above, loan supply can be written as 
 
        (5) 
 
The coefficient c1 combines the loan-supply effects of monetary policy and individual-bank charac-
teristics. In this framework a significant coefficient c1 would imply the existence of a bank lending 
channel, i.e. that monetary policy affects bank loan supply.  
The underlying assumption in the literature is that all banks face identical loan demand. This im-
plies, inter alia, that loan demand does not depend on bank characteristics. If e.g. customers of small 
banks typically reduce their loan demand more than customers of large banks, when faced with an 
interest rate hike, identification of bank lending behaviour becomes impossible. The assumption of 
homogeneous loan demand is thus crucial. As most firms, large or small, have no short-term alter-
native to bank loan financing, this is usually taken as a fairly reasonable benchmark.  
Our empirical model is based on (4) with slight modifications. Following Ehrmann et al 
(2001 and 2003) we interact bank characteristics Xi not only with the monetary policy indicator but 
also with GDP and the price level. Therefore we allow different types of banks to react differently 
to the business cycle. Moreover, in controlling for the business cycle, we assume that the monetary 
policy variable truly captures monetary policy effects and not the potential effects of general mar-
coeconomic variables.  We introduce some dynamics and estimate the empirical model in first dif-
ferences. The basic regression model is thus 
 
  (6) 
 
where i=1, …, N and t=1, …, T. N denotes the number of banks, T the total number of 
time periods (quarters) and l the number of lags.  Lit are loans by bank i at time t to private non-
banking sectors, MP denotes the monetary policy indicator, GDP the  real GDP and CPI the infla-
tion rate. The bank-specific characteristics are denoted by Xi. The model further includes a bank-
specific fixed effect ai and, following Kashyap and Stein (2000), a time trend and its interactions. 
In the second specification the macro-variables and trend are replaced by a compete set of 
time dummies. In the third specification we exclude the macro-variables also from the interaction  
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terms. Thus, following Gambacorta (2005), we allow the coefficients of bank-specific variables to 
vary with monetary policy and with time but not with macroeconomic fluctuations.  
In all of these specifications, the existence of a bank lending channel should be reflected in 
a significant coefficient for the interaction of the bank characteristics with the particular monetary 
policy indicator. The three measures of bank characteristics found in the literature are bank size, 
capitalization and liquidity. Bank size and its capitalization and liquidity ratios are measures that 
may influence a bank's access to and premium on external finance. High levels of liquidity may also 
allow a bank to draw on own liquid funds instead of going to the market after a monetary tighten-




         (7) 
 
 
Size is measured as log of total assets in nominal roubles. Liquidity is the share of liquid assets in 
total assets. Liquid assets are bank reserves + loans to banks + securities. Capitalization is the 
bank's own-capital-to-total assets ratio. All these variables are normalised with respect to their sam-
ple means. The size variable is normalised, not over the whole period, but with respect to the sam-
ple average of each period, in order to remove the constantly increasing trends in size. 
The preceding literature offers little guidance as to the choice of monetary policy variable. 
The studies based on US data frequently use the Fed Funds rate, usually complemented with one or 
two indicator variables based on Federal Reserve statements (Romer dates or Boshen-Mills indica-
tors). The studies on European economies and emerging countries rely on central bank repo rates or 
short-term money market interest rates, irrespective whether the countries target inflation.  
The challenge in analysing Russian monetary policy is that the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR) uses several operations to adjust banking sector liquidity, and consequently there is no single 
interest rate that could be self-evidently used as the monetary policy target rate. During the period 
analysed here, the financial markets were extremely liquid, and therefore CBR operations have 
aimed mainly at tightening liquidity. However, as the interbank market in Russia functions poorly, 
the CBR has occasionally injected liquidity even in times of extreme overall liquidity. Russian fi-Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
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nancial institutions may obtain credit through CBR overnight, repo, Lombard or currency-swap op-
erations.  To tighten liquidity, the CBR uses e.g. deposit and repo auctions. Further, CBR has sold 
government bonds from its balance sheet and in 2005 it started issuing Central Bank bonds (OBR). 
The mulitiplicity of CBR market operations is at least partly explained by the highly fragmented 
structure of the banking sector. Some banks are very narrowly focused, serving only a certain group 
of enterprises or a given region, and hence the types of collateral vary.  
Therefore it should not come as a surprise that the Central Bank's interest rates have his-
torically had very limited effects on interbank market rates and thereby on the cost of loanable 
funds.  Another possibility to proxy CBR's monetary policy stance is to use the fluctuations in 
money stocks. As discussed earlier, Russian monetary policy has a dual objective of stable ex-
change rate and moderate inflation. As an intermediate target, the CBR officially targets growth rate 
of monetary aggregates, especially the broad money M2. It is highly questionable how much control 
the central bank has on M2 (see Vymyatnina, 2006) and therefore we also use the monetary base 
M0 in the regressions. The monetary base includes cash in circulation, commercial-bank deposits 
and required reserves at the central bank, as well as CBR bonds held by banks. The changes in this 
aggregate should be much more under CBR control.  
As there is no consensus on the best measure of monetary policy stance in Russia, we use 
four different variables. In line with much of the previous literature, we use the Russian money 
market rate (Moscow interbank interest rate, 3mMibor). Further, we take the most widely cited 
CBR policy rate, the refinancing rate, which is used e.g. in overnight operations. The interbank in-
terest rate should reflect changes in market liquidity whereas the CBR refinancing rate has generally 
served as the upper bound for market interest rates. Next we use the measure that CBR reportedly 
targets, broad money M2. And finally we take the more narrow measure of money, the monetary 
base M0. Figure 1 plots these four measures in first differences. As expected, the money measures 
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Figure 1  Measures of monetary policy, first differences 
 




Table 3 Correlation between measures of monetary policy in Russia 
 
 
ln(M2)  ln(M0) 
CBR 
refrate 
ln(M2)  1.0000 
    ln(M0)  0.9976  1.0000 
  CBR refrate  -0.8816  -0.8997  1.0000 
MICEX ibrate  -0.5991  -0.6065  0.6563 
 
 
4  Data  
 
The database we use is a quarterly panel of balance sheet data for all Russian banks from the first 
quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 2007 (end-of-period data). For a detailed description of the 
dataset and the cleaning procedures, see Karas-Schoors (2005). Table 4 examines the balance sheet 
data for banks of different size categories in our sample. There is a marked difference between 
small banks (asset size below 50
th percentile) and large banks. Small banks rely almost entirely on 
retail deposits and own capital for their financing. Larger banks (especially those above 90
th percen-












1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1 2007q1
time
ln(M2), D ln(M0), D
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securities. The same holds true for the assets side. Small banks generate less retail loans than large 
banks. At the end of 1Q2007, retail loans represented 54% of small banks’ total assets and 74% for 
large banks.    
 
 
Table 4 - Balance sheets for banks of different sizes          
             
Panel A  Composition of bank balance sheets at 1Q1999 (end-period)       
















Above 98th  
percentile 
Number of banks              
total assets (millions of 2001 
rb)  30.6  156.2  525.4  1292.6  4195  27113.8 
 Share in total system assets              
Share in total bank assets of:            
reserves at CBR  0.17  0.14  0.13  0.09  0.08  0.05 
loans to banks  0.08  0.14  0.22  0.26  0.25  0.21 
loans to government  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.01 
loans to firms  0.41  0.42  0.38  0.39  0.45  0.54 
loans to households  0.07  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02 
investment in securities  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.09  0.07 
other assets   0.20  0.19  0.16  0.14  0.10  0.11 
Total   1.01  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.02  1.00 
               
capital  0.49  0.33  0.21  0.14  0.078  0.1 
deposits of banks  0.02  0.05  0.10  0.18  0.32  0.34 
deposits of government  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.03 
deposits of firms  0.26  0.31  0.36  0.31  0.31  0.26 
deposits of households  0.08  0.11  0.13  0.10  0.06  0.06 
issued debt securities  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.07 
other liabilities  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.16  0.11  0.13 
Total  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
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Panel B Composition of bank balance sheets at 1Q2007 (end-period) 
  














Above 98th  
percentile 
Number of banks              
total assets (millions of 2001 rb)  233.33  1049.34  3483.73  10494.61  25509.49  134314.60 
               
Share in total bank assets of              
reserves at CBR  0.19  0.11  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.05 
loans to banks  0.12  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.15 
lonas to government  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
loans to firms  0.40  0.47  0.50  0.51  0.46  0.49 
loans to households  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.18  0.15 
investment in securities  0.04  0,08  0.10  0.13  0.13  0.14 
other assets   0.11  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.03 
Total assets  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.01 
               
capital  0.29  0.19  0.16  0.14  0.12  0.10 
deposits of banks  0.04  0.07  0.12  0.16  0.16  0.20 
deposits of government  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03 
deposits of firms  0.39  0.38  0.34  0.35  0.37  0.38 
deposits of households  0.22  0.28  0.27  0.20  0.21  0.17 
issued debt securities  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.12  0.09  0.07 
other liabilities  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04 
Total liabilities  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 
The Russian data confirm the pattern found elsewhere (see Kashyap and Stein 2000 for the US): 
small banks hold larger buffer stocks and make fewer loans. The underlying reason is that small 
banks have more trouble in securing external financing due to informational frictions and e.g. very 
limited access to Russian interbank markets.  
 
 
5  Empirical evidence on bank lending channel in Russia 
 
To assess the role of banks in monetary transmission we estimated the model in equation (5). As the 
model is dynamic in the sense that the right-hand side includes lagged dependent variables, the 
standard OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. Therefore we use the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) suggested by Blundell-Bond (1988) to obtain consistent and efficient estimators. 
The GMM estimator first-differences the equation in order to remove individual-bank effects and 
produces an equation that is estimable by instrument variables. The model is estimated with one lag 
of the dependent variable, contemporaneous and one lag for all other variables. Loan growth is in-
strumented with the second to sixth lags of the endogenous variable.  Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
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The key results are reported in table 5. Each column presents the results using one of the 
four monetary policy indicators. We report the estimated long-run coefficients only.  
 
Table 5  Loan growth: long-run coefficients of structural GMM estimations  
  Log(M0)  Log(M2)  Mibor rate  CBR rate 
Monetary policy (MP)  0.30**  0.38**  0.03  0.08 
Capitalization*MP  -2.20**  -3.18**  -0.30  0.27 
Liquidity*MP  -1.04  -1.50  0.25  1.52 
Size*MP  -0.01  -0.02  -0.10*  -0.10 
Real GDP  -0.19***  -0.17***  -0.17***  -0.19** 
Prices  0.33  0.19  0.17  0.06 
         
Observations  35887  35887  35887  35887 
Number of banks  1475  1475  1475  1475 
Sargan-p  0.40  0.42  0.40  0.40 
AR2-p  0.33  0.33  0.38  0.36 
Note: */**/*** denotes significance at 10%/5%/1% level. Time trend, bank characteristics and their interactions, as well as  
interactions between macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics, are included but not reported. 
 
The columns (3) and (4) indicate that changes in the interest rates do not have statistically signifi-
cant effects on bank lending. This confirms our prior expectations that in Russia neither interbank 
rates nor central bank policy interest rates are useful indicators of monetary policy. On the contrary, 
changes in the monetary aggregates do help to explain bank lending. Increases in money base as 
well as increases in broad money are reflected in higher bank lending. The long run effect of a 
change in a monetary aggregate on lending has the expected positive sign and the coefficient is sig-
nificantly different from zero.  
 Concentrating on the first two columns, we find evidence of monetary policy affecting 
bank loan supply. An increase in a monetary aggregate (reflecting monetary policy expansion) in-
creases bank lending, but less so for well capitalized banks. Contrary to most studies on the US or 
euro area, bank liquidity and bank size are not significant in explaining bank lending. We note, 
however, that capitalization and bank size are negatively correlated. As seen from the Table x,  
well-capitalized banks tend to be very small as measured by total assets.   
Fungacova and Solanko (2008) analyse bank capitalization in Russia as a measure of bank 
risk.  They  find  that  smaller  banks  are  indeed  better  capitalized  whereas  foreign  banks  are 
siginificantly less capitalized and state-controlled banks are better capitalized. They further find that 
higher loan growth translates into lower capitalization. Therefore, controlling for everything else, 
banks with rapidly growing loan portfolios have lower capitalization. Our results underline that  
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banks  with  lower  capitalization  react  more  to  changes  in  monetary  policy.  It  is  not  entirely 
surprising that banks with rapidly growing loan portfolios are more dependent on outside funding 
and are therefore more likely to react to changes in market liquidity.  
The  macroeconomic  control  variables  perform  surprisingly  poorly  in  explaining  bank 
lending. The real GDP variable has the unexpected sign and inflation is not at all significant. The 
negative  sign  of  the  GDP  variable  is  mainly  due  to  loan-growth  dynamics.  Loan  growth  has 
relatively rich variation, and the basic model with only one lag of the dependent variable fails to 
correctly capture it. The loan-growth dynamics are picked up by GDP. With 2 or 4 lags of the 
dependent variable included, GDP is no longer significant.  
 
 
6  Some robustness checks 
 
The approach is based on the assumption that the macroeconomic variables included in the model 
can capture the relevant time effects. Following Ehremann et al (2001), we check for the robustness 
of our results with the alternative specification reported in Table 6 below. In the alternative model, 
all macroeconomic variables are replaced by a full set of time dummies. The model is estimated 
with one lag of the dependent variable, contemporaneous and one lag for all other variables. As a 
robustness check, we also estimated the model with two, three and four lags. Our main results re-
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Table 6  Long-run coefficients of structural GMM estimations for alternative model specifications 








  l=1  l=1  l=1  l=1 
MP         
GDP         
CPI         
C*MP  -3.16**  -2.21**  -2.73**  -1.73** 
C*GDP  -0.05  0.01     
C*CPI  -4.74*  -4.64*     
L*MP  -1.30  -0.92  -1.79*  -1.46** 
L*GDP  -0.72  -0.69     
L*CPI  -1.61  -1.58     
S*MP  -0.02  -0.01  0.06  0.07 
S*GDP  0.09**  0.09**     
S*CPI  -0.01  -0.03     
         
Observations  35887  35887  35887  35887 
Number of bank  1475  1475  1475  1475 
Sargan-p  0.39  0.39  0.34  0.35 
AR2-p  0.34  0.34  0.33  0.34 
Note: */**/*** denotes significance at 10%/5%/1% level. In spec 2 bank characteristics, time dummies  
and  their interactions are included but not reported. In spec 3, time dummies are included but not reported.   
 
 
In the both models the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between monetary policy and 
bank characteristics are of similar magnitude. This serves as a further confirmation of our results. 
Well capitalized banks consistently adjust their lending behaviour less than the other banks in the 
face of a monetary policy change. An easing of monetary policy increases bank lending but less so 
for well capitalized banks. The main results remain unchanged also when each of the bank charac-
teristics was added one at a time to the model. Only the interaction of monetary policy with capi-
talization was significant.    
As a further robustness check, we controlled for the structure of a bank's loan portfolio as a 
proxy for possible differences in bank's loan demand. In the spirit of Gambacorta (2005), the basic 
model was estimated with the loans for enterprises as the dependent variable. The results remain 
qualitatively the same. On the contrary, the model failed to produce significant results when the 
changes in household loans was used as the dependent variable. This result is not too surprising. 
Household loans still constitute only a tiny share of the total bank lending in Russia.  
We also checked whether bank ownership matters for bank lending. We divided banks in 
our sample into three ownership groups: state-controlled, foreign and domestic private banks. State 
controlled banks are defined as in Karas et al. (2009). The foreign ownership dummy is based on 
CBR data on banks with foreign ownership share exceeding 50%. One might expect that both state 
and foreign banks have better access to alternative funding sources via their owners. And therefore  
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private domestic banks would react most to changes in monetary policy. Alternatively, one could 
assume that in Russia state controlled banks are especially inclined to follow policy guidance from 
the CBR and the government. Contrary to our expectations and e.g. to results by Vinhas de Souza 
(2006), we did not find evidence for bank ownership being significant in any of the specifications. 
What matters for the bank lending channel in Russia is bank capitalization.  
 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the role of banks in monetary policy transmission mechanism in Russia. As 
the stated long term goal of Russian Central Bank is to switch to inflation targeting, understanding 
how the banking sector reacts to changes in monetary policy stance is very important.  
We use a large panel of all Russian banks covering 1999-2007 and dynamic panel data 
methods. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that the bank lending channel exists in Rus-
sia. The existence of a bank lending channel has potentially important implications for the conduct 
of monetary policy. In the face of monetary contraction, banks will reduce their lending, but well 
capitalized banks are likely to react much less than other banks. The finding suggests that well capi-
talized banks in effect attenuate monetary policy transmission.  
On the other hand, factors like bank size and liquidity are generally not important for the 
way a bank reacts to monetary policy changes. We explain the absence of size and liquidity effects 
by the characteristics of the Russian banking sector. Size and capitalization are clearly negatively 
correlated whereas the poor functioning of the interbank markets drives all Russian banks to hold 
sizable liquidity buffers.  
To sum up, the results of this paper indicate that changes in monetary policy lead banks to 
change their loan supply. The strength of the lending channel depends on a bank's capitalization. 
Our results suggest that the well capitalized banks face smaller informational frictions and have eas-






 Tuuli Juurikkala, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko   The role of banks in monetary policy transmission:  
Empirical evidence from Russia 
 
 
  22 
References 
Arena, Marco, Carmen Reinhard and Francisco Vazquez (2007): The Lending Channel in Emerging 
Economices: Are Foreign Banks Different? IMF Working Paper 07/48. 
Altunbas, Yener, Otabek Fazylov and Philip Molyneyx (2002), Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 
2093-2110.  
Benkovskis, Konstantins (2008): Is there a bank lending channel of monetary policy in Latvia? Evi-
dence from bank level data. Latvijas Banka Working Paper 1/2008.  
Bernanke, Ben and A. Blinder (1988): Credit, Money and Aggrerate Demand. American Economic 
Review 78, 435-439.  
Egert, Balazs and Ronals MacDonald (2009): Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Surveying the Surveyable. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No. 654, OECD.  
Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre and Worms (2001): Financial Systems and the 
role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area. European Central Bank 
Working Paper No. 105. 
Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre and Worms (2003): Financial Systems and the 
role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area, in Angeloni, Kashyap and 
Mojon (eds.), Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area. Cambridge University Press.  
Esanov, Akram, Christian Merkl and Lucio Vinhas de Souza (2005): Monetary Policy rules for 
Russia. Journal of Comparative Economics 33, 484-499.  
Fungacova, Zuzana and Laura Solanko (2008): Risk-taking by Russian banks. Do location, owner-
ship or size matter? BOFIT Discussion Paper 21/2008.  
Gambacorta, Leonardo (2005) Inside the bank lending channel. European Economic Review 49, 
1737-1759.  
Golodniuk, Inna (2006): Evidence on the bank-lending channel in Ukraine. Research in Interna-
tional Business and Finance 20, 180-199.  
Karas, Alexei and Koen Schoors (2005): Heracles or Sisyphus? Finding, cleaning and reconstruct-
ing a database of Russian banks. Ghent University Working Paper 05/327. 
Karas, Alexei, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill (2009): Are private banks more efficient than pub-
lic banks? Evidence from Russia. Economics of Transition (forthcoming) 
Kashyap, Anil K. and Jeremy Stein (2000): What do a million observations in banks say about the 
transmission of monetary policy? American Economic review,Vol 90, no,3, 407-428.  
Keller, Peter and Thomas J. Richardson (2003): Nominal Anchors in the CIS. IMF Working Paper 
03/179. 
Kishan, Ruby P. and Timothy P. Opiela (2000): Bank size, bank capital, and the bank lending chan-
nel. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol 32, no. 1, 121-141.  
Kishan, Ruby P. and Timothy P. Opiela (2006): Bank capital and loan assymmetry in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol 30, 259-285.  
Korhonen, Iikka and Aaron Mehrotra (2009): Money Demand in post-crisis Russia: de-dollarization 
and re-monetisation. Emerging Markets Trade and Finance, forthcoming.   
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/ 2009 
 
 
  23 
Matousek, Roman and Nicholas Sarantis (2009): The bank lending channel and monetary policy 
transmission in Central and Eastern European countries. Journal of Comparative Economics, 
forthcoming.  
Vdovichenko, Anna and Victoria Voronina (2006): Monetary policy rules and their application in 
Russia. Research in International Business and Finance 20, 145-162.  
Vinhas de Souza, Lucio (2006): Estimating the Existence of the Bank Lending Channel in the Rus-
sian Federation. Bank I Kredyt, wrzesien 2006, Central Bank of Poland.  
Vymyatnina, Yulia (2006) How much control does Bank of Russia have over money supply? Re-
search in International Business and Finance 20, 131-144. 
 
 Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by BOFIT, see 
bofit  www.bof.fi/
No 1  Tuuli Koivu: Has the Chinese economy become more sensitive to interest rates? Studying credit demand in 













































































Bank of Finland 
BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
PO Box 160 
FIN-00101 Helsinki 
 
 + 358 10 831 2268 
bofit@bof.fi 
 http://www.bof.fi/bofit 